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n 2000 the Chatham House 
forum, part of the Royal 
Institution of International 
Affairs, produced a document entitled 
‘The Winds of Change.’ This document 
was based on research conducted by a 
consortium of business leaders, military 
personnel and political groups.  The aim 
was to inform the thinking of mangers 
who needed to take irreversible decisions 
which involved committing resources 
for large parts of the next two decades. 
For instance: oil companies making 
decisions about where their upstream 
and downstream investments should go; 
healthcare companies making decisions 
about the nature of payment models 
for new pharmaceuticals; and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
planning how to deal with long term 
humanitarian relief.
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So the decade 2000 – 2010 (conflict) 
was more volatile than 1990 – 2000 
(transition) which in turn was more 
dramatic than 1980 – 1990 (liberalism) 
and 1970 – 1980 (the end of orthodoxy) 
and 1960 – 1970 (consumption).  This 
article outlines what might be the themes 
of the next two decades.  All we know 
at the moment is that they may be more 
volatile than the one we have just  
lived through.  
If we refer back to the ‘Winds of Change’ 
document from 2000 we will be struck 
by how prescient this document was.  
The main thrust of the publication was 
to suggest that the world would develop 
along one of three scenarios from 2000  
– 2020.  These scenarios are:
Scenario 1 - Faster, faster
The world would continue to globalise 
as a de-regulated financial system 
continues to drive towards a single 
global free market.  China would 
continue to absorb western capital 
and technology and more and more 
economies would de-regulate and join 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Scenario 2 – Post-industrial 
revolution 
The economy takes a less forceful 
role in determining our lives and both 
political and civil institutions such as 
NGOs take a stronger role.  The world 
is less global, more stable and countries 
retain strong national identities.  In this 
scenario Iceland would still be Iceland.
Scenario 3 - Rough 
neighbours 
The ‘rough neighbours’ scenario could 
be described as ‘faster, faster, bang’.  
The key feature of this scenario is 
widespread, low intensity conflict.  
There is ‘a West’ versus ‘the Rest’ 
ideological struggle and even within 
the West and the Rest there is conflict 
between nations (the US is at odds 
with the EU). Within nations there 
is conflict as a narrow economic 
base creates disparity leading to civil 
disruption such as crime and violence.   
You are probably thinking how much 
the world has already gone towards 
‘rough neighbours’.  Economically 
‘faster, faster bang’ could not be a 
more accurate description of the 
decade.  The world economy literally 
crashed in 2007 and the crash was 
all the more dynamic because of the 
immense speed we were moving at.   
The
Next
Looking back now at the world in 2000 from 
this vantage point we ought probably to be 
impressed at what we have seen and lived 
through. This was before 9/11, before the 
second Gulf War, before oil at $150 a barrel, 
before the fall of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
before the rise of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
before broadband, before Obama, before 
China was a superpower and so on.
So the world has changed greatly since 2000, 
but then it changed between 1990 and 2000, 
although perhaps less dramatically.  There 
is a popular stylised fact that the pace of 
change is increasing, driven by globalisation. 
Interconnectedness extends and accelerates 
changes that start in one place and then 
extend to others, such as the banking crisis 
where US home loans end up causing a 
property crash in Dubai and a near  
recession in China.  
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Table 1 (opposite) gives some clues about 
what the future holds.  The fi gures reveal 
that by 2030, the average Western child will 
be a little more than four times richer than 
the average child in ‘the Rest’.  Currently 
Western children are nearly seven times 
richer than those in ‘the Rest’.   The world 
will become more equal.  This is the reversal 
of the trend of the second half of the 20th 
century which saw two decades of increasing 
global inequality.  The primary driver of this 
inequality was capital.  In the UK there was 
an eight-fold increase in the value of fi xed 
capital per person – from $2,000 to $16,000 
in real terms.  This increased output per 
worker made us richer.  
The second driver of inequality was 
education.  In the UK in 1950 the average 
worker had completed 10 years of education. 
In 2000 it was 15 years.  In the US the fi gure 
for fi xed capital per person was $30,000, 
nearly twice the UK level in 2000 and for 
‘skills’, ie, education, it was 20 years.
The table shows that the UK and America 
will stay rich countries, in terms of standard of 
living, but the UK is also still a rich country in 
terms of standard of living. Its relative position 
from 1950 to 2000 did not fall very much on 
this measure.  Nevertheless the UK stopped 
being a superpower at that time, as America 
will start to do from 2010 – 2030.  
Table 2 (opposite) doesn’t look at Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per head, but 
GDP per country. It is this which confers 
superpower status; and with it the political 
and cultural domination that shapes the 
way the world works.
Table 2 defi nes power not standard 
of living. It shows the high point of US 
power was at the end of the century, 
ie from 1990 to 2000.  Having declared 
victory over communism economically 
and politically in 1990, the US had slightly 
less than a quarter of the world’s GDP.  
By 2000 the US was richer than the 
whole of  Western Europe for the fi rst 
time in peace-time history, but 2001 
was the last time ever that the West as 
a whole will be the dominant economic 
force globally. China is now at the start 
of 2010 a G2 economy. In 2030 it will 
be a G1 economy. China will be the 
global superpower. China knows it and 
understands it. The US knows it and 
business knows it. China will be fi ve times 
the size of Japan, three times the size of 
the whole of Latin America; and twice 
the size of India. This century is China’s 
century. 
So what we are seeing now in our ‘rough 
neighbours’ window on the world is 
the kind of disorder that accompanies 
the transfer of superpower status.  For 
instance, when the shift was from Great 
Britain to the US, the process began in 
1900 and took two World Wars and a 
global depression – effectively writing off the 
fi rst half of the 20th century.  American poet 
Robert Lowell once described this as “our 
worst century ever”.  Since 2000 the main 
changes in the world have been towards 
Rough Neighbours. For example 9/11 is the 
abiding image of the decade and set off the 
fi rst World War of the century: the Global 
War on Terror.  The US and China are 
locked in a power struggle over the value 
of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) , which 
America wants to revalue. If we can manage 
the transfer of power to China in a way 
which is both peaceful and prosperous, then 
our economic prospects are astonishing.  
By 2030 China will have built 50 new cities, 
each with 10 million people in them.  The 
impact of this culturally, economically and 
politically is immense.  It is something we 
have never seen before. For the fi rst time 
since industrialisation 250 years ago, the 
world’s dominant economic and political 
force will be non-Western, non-Christian 
and possibly non-democratic. 
For further information contact the author 
at s.regan@cranfi eld.ac.uk
Table 1:      GDP per capita (in 1990 US Dollars)
1900 1950 1990 2001 2030
W Europe 2,893 4,579 15,966 19,256 30,503




3,435 7,424 17,902 21,718 42,694
Japan 1,180 1,921 18,789 20,683 32,774
“West” 2,952 5,649 18,781 22,509 35,932
E Europe 1,438 2,111 5,450 6,027 12,334
former 
USSR 1,237 2,841 6,878 4,626 9,508
Latin
America 1,109 2,506 5,053 5,811 8,949
China 545 439 1,858 3,583 11,174
India 599 619 1,309 1,957 6,103
Other Asia 802 918 3,084 3,997 12,465
Africa 601 894 1,444 1,489 1,987
“Rest” 749 1,091 2,713 3,377 8,304
World 1,262 2,111 5,157 6,049 11,689
Table 2: GDP per entity (billion in 1990 US Dollars)
1900 1950 1990 2001 2030
W Europe 676 1,396 6,033 7,550 11,964




34 180 862 1,190 1,914
Japan 52 161 2,321 2,625 3,975
“West” 1,075 3,192 15,020 19,331 33,704
E Europe 102 185 663 729 1,480
former 
USSR 154 510 1,988 1,343 2,805
Latin 
America 72 416 2,239 3,087 5,960
China 218 240 2,109 4,570 16,504
India 171 222 1,098 2,003 8,630
Other Asia 116 361 3,099 4,908 17,775
Africa 66 203 905 1,223 2,622
“Rest” 899 2,137 12,101 17,863 55,776
World 1,974 5,330 27,122 37,194 89,480
MF
Source: Professor Angus Maddison (2005)
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